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Abstract 
In the three decades leading up to the financial crisis of 2008/09, income inequality rose across much of the developed 
world. This has led to a vigorous debate as to whether widening inequality was somehow to blame for the crisis. At the 
heart of this debate is the question of whether rising inequality leads to private sector credit booms, which are, in turn, 
widely accepted as a macroeconomic risk factor. Despite growing interest, empirical evidence on an inequality-fragility 
relationship is limited. That which does exist fails to tip the balance of evidence conclusively one way or the other. This 
research adds to this scarce body of evidence. Based on an econometric analysis of a panel of eighteen OECD countries 
covering the period 1970-2007, this study finds a statistically significant, positive relationship between income 
concentration and private sector indebtedness when controlling for conventional credit determinants. The implications 
of such a relationship are twofold. First, the view that the distribution of income is irrelevant to macroeconomic 
outcomes (implicit in mainstream economic thought) needs a second look. Second, if policy makers wish to make the 
financial system more robust, they should cast the net wider than regulatory and monetary policy reforms, and consider 
the effects of changes to the distribution income. 
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1. Introduction 
In the three decades leading up to the financial crisis of 2008/09, economic inequality rose across 
much of the developed world (Atkinson et al. 2011; OECD, 2011). This rise was nowhere more pronounced 
than in the United States – the country at the epicentre of the crisis – where, by the mid-2000s, income 
concentration reached magnitudes not seen since the period immediately preceding the Great Depression. 
Against this backdrop, a lively debate has re-emerged as to whether inequality may play, directly or 
indirectly, some destabilising role in the economy. 
Central to this debate is the question of whether high or widening inequality contributes to the 
excessive accumulation of debt, which, in turn, is widely recognised as being the ultimate driver behind 
episodes of financial instability. The latter notion can be traced back to Fisher (1932; 1933) who argued that 
“all great booms and depressions” are ultimately caused by two dominant factors, “[…] namely, over 
indebtedness to start with and deflation following soon after” (Fisher, 1933, p. 341). Building on this view, 
Minsky (1975; 1982; 1986) placed the expansion of corporate debt at the heart of his financial instability 
hypothesis. He argued that an inherent feature of capitalist economies is the propensity for the financial 
system to swing between periods of extreme robustness and extreme fragility. Paradoxically, it is precisely 
the environment of economic prosperity and stability itself that shows the seeds of the ensuing financial 
collapse. During prosperous times, when corporate incomes are high (in excess of what is needed to pay off 
debt) a speculative euphoria develops and lending surpasses what borrowers can possibly repay from future 
incoming cash flows. The eventual result is widespread default, shortly followed by a liquidity crisis and 
asset price deflation. Lending contracts sharply and even those businesses that are creditworthy are denied 
access to finance, leading to a contraction in the real economy. Kindleberger (1978) tells a similar story, 
whereby a benign economic environment creates a sense of optimism for the future. As a result, asset prices 
rise, leading to yet further optimism. Key in this narrative is investors’ use of credit to gain increased 
exposure to rising asset prices, driving prices up further. A self-reinforcing mania develops and profit 
expectations depart significantly from their fundamental potential, all the while debt to income ratios rise and 
capital ratios fall. The crisis reveals itself when something occurs to expose the true extent of this over-
optimism, and a panic ensues. Asset prices crash as investors rush to liquidate their positions at the same 
time. A substantial body of empirical research, mostly developed in the last decade, has confirmed that 
episodes of financial instability are indeed precipitated by excessive levels of debt, in some form or other 
(see, for example, Borio and White, 2003; Mendoza and Terrones, 2008; Elekdag and Wu, 2011; Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2009; Shularick and Taylor, 2012). 
Accordingly, the investigation of the roots of financial instability needs to focus on the drivers of 
credit/debt expansion. The existing body of theories (see Mendoza and Terrones, 2008, for a review) 
provides explanations related to: herd behavior by banks (Kindleberger, 2000); information problems that 
lead to bank-interdependent lending policies (Rajan, 1994); the underestimation of risks (Borio, et. al., 2001) 
and the loosening of lending standards (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006); the presence of government 
guarantees (Corsetti, et. al., 1999); limited commitment on the part of borrowers (Lorenzoni, 2005); business 
cycles and financial accelerators (e.g., Bernanke et al., 1999; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). On the empirical 
side, the factors established as being key drivers of credit expansion include: deregulation of the financial 
system (Demirguc-Kunt and Detriagiache, 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Ranciére, Tornell and 
Westermann, 2006; Decressin and Terrones, 2011); accommodative monetary policy (Borio and White, 
2003; Elekdag and Wu, 2011; Mendoza and Terrones, 2008); rapid economic growth (Mendoza and 
Terrones, 2008); and inflows of foreign capital (Elekdag and Wu, 2011; Mendoza and Terrones, 2008; 
Decressin and Terrones 2011). The key question that this paper seeks to address is whether the redistribution 
of income should also be added to this list.  
 Despite a growing interest and theoretical debate into the inequality/credit/crisis relationship (see 
section 2), the empirical research is still scanty. The purpose of this paper is to add to this scarce evidence 
with an empirical model derived from a critical discussion of the existing literature. We are able to present 
the results of an econometric analysis for a panel of 18 OECD developed economies covering the period 
1970-2007, which shows a statistically significant, direct, positive relationship between income 
concentration and private sector indebtedness, when controlling for other credit determinants. In the same 
sample, private sector indebtedness is shown, as a preliminary exercise, to increase the probability of 
financial crisis. 
 The contribution of the paper to the existing knowledge is twofold. On the conceptual side, besides 
providing a thorough review and discussion of the existing literature on the topic, we provide an organised 
view of the channels through which widening inequality favours credit expansion. On the empirical side, we 
complement the only cross-country evidence so far available, by Bordo and Meissner (2012), which is our 
main empirical inspiration and concluded for the inexistence of an inequality/credit nexus. However, we 
depart from this reference work in many instances, regarding: (i) the choice of the measure of credit (a 
broader, more inclusive metric); (ii) the estimation of the model in levels rather than in changes (assigning 
relevance to the amount of credit in relation to the size of the economy in determining the risk of a crisis); 
(iii) the explicit consideration of the threats posed by endogeneity and reverse causation issues; (iv) the 
explicit consideration of the institutional drivers of credit expansion (by means of an indicator of financial 
deregulation); (v) the consequent restriction of the time span of the analysis to the last four decades, even 
though with the addition of four countries. Our more limited time coverage is, however, not to be regarded as 
a major drawback, since it corresponds to the period in which credit started to remarkably decouple from 
broad money as a result of increased leverage and augmented funding via the nonmonetary liabilities of 
banks. A period in which most developed economies entered an age of unprecedented financial innovation, 
risk and leverage, which eventually undermined their stability (Schularich and Taylor, 2012). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on inequality, 
credit and financial fragility and provides the conceptual framework on which our empirical model relies. 
Section 3 describes the data, provides some preliminary descriptive evidence, and presents the methodology 
and the findings of the econometric model. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Inequality, Indebtedness and crisis: theoretical explanations and empirical evidence 
The notion that inequality may be linked to economic instability is not new. Writing on the causes of 
the Great Crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression, Marriner Eccles, chairman of the Federal Reserve 
during that period, argued that: 
“a giant suction pump had by 1929-1930 drawn into a few hands an increasing portion of 
currently produced wealth. This served them as capital accumulations. But by taking 
purchasing power out of the hands of mass consumers, the savers denied themselves the kind 
of effective demand for their products that would justify a reinvestment of their capital 
accumulations in new plants. In consequence, as in a poker game where the chips were 
concentrated in fewer and fewer hands, the other fellows could stay in the game only by 
borrowing. When their credit ran out, the game stopped” (Eccles, 1951, p. 76, cited in Reich, 
2010) 
John K. Galbraith argued in similar vein in his best seller ‘The Great Crash’, wherein he highlighted 
the “bad distribution of income” as being the first of “five weaknesses [that] seem to have had an especially 
intimate bearing on the ensuing disaster” (1992, p.97; original edition 1954). 
 Following the onset of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, interest in this notion has been 
rekindled, with a number of analyses suggesting that widening inequality may have played a key role in the 
recent crisis. These include a number of popular books (e.g. Rajan, 2010; Reich; 2010; Galbraith, 2012; 
Stiglitz, 2012; Palley, 2012), policy-focused papers (e.g. Stiglitz, 2009; IMF-ILO, 2010; UN commission of 
experts, 2012; Krueger, 2012), and opinion editorials penned by prominent economic commentators (e.g. 
Milanovic, 2009; Wade, 2010; Roubini, 2011). In addition to these somewhat informal contributions, there is 
also a small (but growing) body of academic research that has attempted to more formally analyse the 
relationship empirically and theoretically (e.g. Atkinson and Morelli, 2010, 2011; Kumhof and Rancière, 
2010; Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2011; Kumhof et al., 2012; Tridico, 2012; Bordo and Meissner, 2012; van 
Treek, 2013).  
 Rajan’s book ‘Fault lines’ (2010) contributed much of the momentum to the current debate. Argues 
that rising inequality in the U.S. pressured governments of all political persuasions to enact policies aimed at 
improving the lot of those low- and middle-income voters being left behind. However, in the polarised world 
of American politics, the usual recourse of governments in such circumstances – the redistribution of income 
via taxes and social spending – is politically toxic. Instead successive governments chose to placate those 
voters by enacting policies that would expand their access to credit—a solution that attracted far less political 
attention, and hence was far more palatable to both sides of the political divide. These policies included the 
deregulation of credit markets and the encouragement of state-owned mortgage agencies to expand lending 
to low-income households. This created a glut of credit, which households obligingly guzzled as a substitute 
for rising incomes as they sought to attain the standard of living they had come to expect. The resulting 
credit bubble laid the foundations for the subsequent crisis. 
 However, Acemoglu (2011) suggests that this explanation may misinterpret the true cause and effect 
relationship. He posits an alternative hypothesis whereby – instead of rising inequality pressuring a political 
response that then causes a crisis – it was politics that drove both inequality and the financial crisis. There is 
concomitance, not causation. Citing evidence from Bartels (2008) and Gilens (2005), Acemoglu argues that 
the policies of politicians over the period in question were, in fact, more closely aligned to the preferences of 
a minority of high-income voters than they were to the preferences of the majority of low and middle-income 
voters. Instead of redistributive policies favouring low- and middle-income constituents, politicians 
implemented financial deregulation policies favouring influential high-income constituents (many of whom 
worked in, or directly benefited from, the financial sector). 
 Key to this narrative is the political influence that wealth brings. Yet, Acemoglu does not link rising 
income concentrations to increased political influence amongst the affluent (perhaps he leaves this for his 
audience to infer) despite this being a central tenet of Bartels’s study, on which his argument is founded. 
With the addition of this component, inequality may once more be seen to lead to increased financial 
instability through a self-reinforcing process: 1) rising inequality leads to increased political influence 
amongst the wealthy; 2) this is used to promote policies of financial market deregulation; 3) this leads to 
both financial instability and rising inequality; and back to1). The possibility of higher income 
concentrations affording those at the top of the distribution greater political influence with which to promote 
policies of financial deregulation in the pursuit of personal interest is also explored by Krugman (2012). The 
key difference between this hypothesis and Rajan’s hypothesis, then, is the end of the distribution from 
which deregulatory pressure comes. 
 To summarise, the above narratives suggest that widening income disparities in the U.S. led to 
financial instability via the political process as a result of increased pressure on politicians to enact polices of 
financial deregulation. Depending on the account, this pressure came from opposing ends of the distribution 
of income. From the bottom, growing discontent pressured politicians into providing low- and middle-
income households with access to credit as a substitute for rising household income. From the top, an 
increasingly wealthy – and hence increasingly influential – elite pressured politicians into liberalising 
financial markets for their own personal gain. 
 The theories outlined above relate specifically to recent events in the United States. It is the interplay 
between rising inequality and U.S. politics that caused the credit boom and the subsequent crisis, with the 
deregulation of financial markets being an intermediate output. This indirect explanation is therefore 
compatible with the US experience only and there is no suggestion that the relationship should hold in a 
different place or time. Alternative, more general lines of reasoning are therefore needed to explain the 
mechanism via which rising inequality might be linked to an abnormal increase in household indebtedness. 
In the spirit of Kalecki (1942) and Kaldor (1955), Stiglitz (2009; 2012) and Fitoussi and Saraceno 
(2010; 2011) argue that rising income inequality in run-up to the crisis redistributed income from households 
with a high propensity to consume to those with a low propensity to consume, weighing on consumption 
expenditure and supressing aggregate demand. The policy response from modern inflation/output targeting 
central banks was to loosen monetary conditions to support demand. This propped up consumption for a 
while, but it could not go on forever; private sector debt eventually reached unsustainable levels and the 
credit bubble burst. Adding strength to this under-consumption argument is the empirical evidence on the 
cross-sectional relationship between relative income (i.e. position within the income distribution) and the 
marginal propensity to save, which tends to find a positive correlation (see e.g. Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes, 
2004).  
 All preceding explanations are political economy ones, in the sense that higher income inequality 
does not, per se, result in higher levels of indebtedness and increased financial fragility. Rather, in certain 
institutional settings, high levels of inequality provoke a political or monetary response, which are then 
responsible for the expansion of credit, the excessive build up of debt, and the corresponding financial 
instability. Although intellectually appealing, these approaches appear of a limited explanatory power, since 
policy actions are always the complex outcome of a convergence of economic, political and social forces; 
reducing them to be primarily driven by inequality patterns seems therefore an over simplification. 
An alternative theory is that a more direct link between inequality and indebtedness (and hence risk 
of crisis) exists, i.e. one that does not rely on very specific institutional arrangements, and so holds in a more 
general sense. Taking a more formal approach than those discussed above, Kumhof and Rancière (2010) 
develop a closed economy DSGE model in which a financial crisis is the endogenous result of rising income 
inequality. They take as stylised facts the correlation between rising income inequality and credit growth in 
the US, in both the periods preceding the 1929 market crash and in the run up to recent financial crisis. They 
argue that in both instances credit growth was an equilibrium outcome. When the model is calibrated to US 
data, simulations show how increased income inequality can endogenously lead to credit growth, higher 
leverage and increased probability of a financial crisis. The model has at its heart two classes of economic 
agent: investors (defined as the top 5% of earners) who own all of the capital, earn only capital income, and 
save and invest as well as consume; and workers (everyone else) who earn only wage income and use this 
only for consumption. A key assumption is that workers have some minimal consumption level that they 
must attain, which is a function of some previously attained level of consumption, and that they will turn to 
credit markets, which are assumed to be perfect, if necessary in order to attain this. When a shock reduces 
the bargaining power of workers relative to investors, the workers, faced with declining real wage growth, 
borrow in order maintain their desired level of consumption. On the other side of the transaction, investors 
lend to the workers out of their rising incomes via financial intermediaries, which they own. As inequality 
increases, workers become increasingly indebted to investors, who amass claims on them. The saving and 
borrowing behaviour of these two groups leads to increased demand for financial intermediation, and the size 
of the financial sector grows in relation to the rest of the economy. All this while, leverage of the household 
and financial sector increases, thus increasing the probability of a financial crisis. A key feature of this model 
is that consumption inequality rises much more slowly than income inequality due to the substitution of 
loans for income at the bottom of the distribution. This is consistent with documented trends concerning the 
relative evolution of income and consumption inequalities in the U.S. and elsewhere in the run-up to the 
recent crisis (e.g. for the U.S. see Kruger and Perri, 2006; for the UK see Blundell and Etheridge, 2010; for 
Canada see Brzozowski et al., 2010; and for Italy, see Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2009)  
Thus, in this theoretical framework an increase in income inequality leads to both an increase in 
supply of credit from those at the top of the distribution, and an increase in demand for credit from those at 
the bottom of the distribution. On the supply side, higher income inequality favours savings (and thus credit 
availability) due to the rich having a higher propensity to save (in this model the bottom 95% do not save at 
all). Such a transmission mechanism, from increasing income concentration at the top of the distribution to 
increased availability of household credit, is also proposed by Fitoussi and Saraceno (2010; 2011) and 
Milanovic (2009). The latter argues that rising inequality in the U.S. led to vast accumulations of wealth at 
the top of the income distribution, which led to a glut of funds seeking profitable investment. The financial 
sector, overwhelmed by the volume of funds seeking investment relative to profitable opportunities in the 
productive sector (but ever keen to earn the associated transaction fees, nonetheless) became increasingly 
more inventive and reckless, “basically throwing money at anyone who would take it” (Milanovic, 2010, 
p.194). 
On the demand side, higher inequality causes those lower down the income distribution to borrow 
more in order to maintain consumption expenditure as their income falls. This finding is consistent with 
previous U.S. based studies on the relationship between income inequality and household debt by Iacovello 
(2008) Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) and Krueger and Perry (2006). However, a key point of 
contention is the extent to which observed increases in measured income inequality reflects widening 
dispersion of permanent (i.e. lifetime) income or widening dispersion of transitory (i.e. current period) 
income. Kruger and Perry find that income inequality increased significantly over the period 1980 – 2003, 
both between and within groups of households with the same characteristics (e.g. age, gender, and race) and 
that, whilst between-group income and consumption inequality followed a similar path, within-group 
consumption inequality rose much more slowly than between-group consumption inequality. They argue that 
the increase in within-group inequality can be explained by increased volatility of idiosyncratic labour 
income (i.e. increased transitory income dispersion), which increased demand for credit for insurance.  This 
view fits comfortably within mainstream modelling frameworks based on the permanent income and 
lifecycle models (Friedman, 1957; Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954). In their strictest form, these hypotheses 
state that (under certain assumptions) a household’s consumption expenditure in a given period will be an 
annuity of its permanent income, irrespective of fluctuations in transitory income. Any deviation of 
temporary income from this annuity will be smoothed via recourse to credit markets. In a good year, a 
household will save any excess; in a bad year, they will borrow to cover any shortfall. However, whilst this 
paradigm allows that increased variance in transitory income might lead to higher borrowing, it denies the 
possibility of rising inequality of permanent income leading to higher borrowing—any change in permanent 
income would simply cause a corresponding change in consumption. Yet in Kumhof and Ranciere’s model, 
households at the bottom of the income distribution borrow to maintain consumption after a shock effects the 
distribution of permanent income. Moreover, insofar as the U.S. experience is concerned, recent empirical 
evidence strongly suggests that the observed rise in measured income inequality in recent decades has been 
predominantly driven by increased dispersion in permanent income, with increased variability of transitory 
income playing a much smaller role, if any (see e.g. Kopczuk, Saez and Song, 2010; Debacker et al., 2013). 
Van Treek (2013, p.10) argues that in order to properly understand the effects of the distribution of 
permanent income on consumption and savings decisions, the permanent income hypothesis must be 
abandoned in favor of the lesser known relative income hypothesis, originally formulated by Duesenberry 
(1947). This hypothesis posits that a household’s consumption expenditure in a given period is a function of 
some previously attained maximum level of consumption expenditure, and of the consumption expenditure 
of reference households. Thus, this theory explicitly allows for a relationship between the redistribution of 
permanent income and aggregate consumption behavior. As permanent income is redistributed in favour of 
those at the top of the distribution, those households that have been affected negatively will run down 
savings or dissave in an attempt to maintain consumption in proportion to some previously achieved level, 
and in an attempt to emulate the consumption expenditure of other reference households who benefitted 
positively from the redistribution. The latter channel is emphasized by Frank et al. (2010) who build a 
theoretical model of consumer behaviour with the concept of relativity of consumption at its very 
foundations. They argue that rising inequality leads to expenditure cascades, “whereby increased expenditure 
by some people leads others just below them on the income scale to spend more as well, in turn leading 
others just below the second group to spend more, and so on”. In support of this hypothesis, they present 
empirical evidence of a positive relationship between the level of income inequality in the 100 most densely 
populated U.S. counties and three different measures of financial distress. Bertrand and Morse (2013) 
provide further empirical support via an econometric analysis of the relationship between the consumption of 
“non-rich” households (those below the 80th percentile of the income distribution) and the income and 
consumption of the “rich” (percentile) within US states in a given year. Their key finding is that the 
consumption expenditure and the income of rich households within each US state in a given period of time is 
a significant predictor, both statistically and in a material economic sense, of the consumption expenditure of 
non-rich households within that state, holding the income of those middle-income households constant. 
According to their results, a 1 percent rise in the consumption expenditure of rich households increases the 
consumption expenditure of non-rich households by 0.18 percent.  As a next step, they attempt to test the 
extent to which the permanent income hypothesis can explain these findings, given the possibility that, in 
states where top income levels are higher, non-rich households may rationally expect their incomes to rise in 
future thus increasing their present-day consumption. They do this by regressing future non-rich household 
income on rich-household income (along with various other control variables) and but in no specifications do 
they find the relationship to be significant. 
Whilst theoretical explanations of an inequality-crisis relationship abound, empirical evidence in the 
relationship is limited. Kumhof et al. (2012) build on Kumhof and Rancière (2010) by opening up the model 
to the international sector. They begin by documenting the simultaneous rise in inequality, current account 
imbalances, and household indebtedness across the globe. To the original closed economy model, they add 
foreign agents who both work and invest. As before, following a bargaining shock that causes the income 
share of workers to decline at the expense of investors, the latter react by lending a portion of their increased 
income back to workers who seek to maintain their relative consumption. In an open economy, investors also 
profit from being able to intermediate the savings of foreigners to domestic workers. Calibrating the model to 
UK data, simulations show that increased inequality endogenously leads to credit expansion, increased 
leverage and increased current account deficits, which in turn increase the probability of a systemic financial 
crisis. The model is also calibrated to investigate the situation where the policy response to rising inequality 
is financial deregulation (as per the “Thatcher years”) finding that, although this helps to smooth workers’ 
consumption in the short-run, this comes at the expense of even higher household indebtedness and higher 
debt service payments—resulting lower consumption in the long run. Another key effect of introducing 
deregulation is to encourage investors to channel much more of their additional income into financial 
investments over real investments. This further stimulates aggregate demand whilst at the same time 
constraining aggregate supply by slowing down capital accumulation. As a complement to this theoretical 
model, Kumhof and co-authors also conduct an econometric analysis using a panel of 18 OECD countries 
over the period 1968-2006. They find that income concentration (measured by the top 1% and top 5% 
income share) is a statistically significant predictor of external deficits. For example, a one percentage point 
rise in the share of income going to the top 1% results in a deterioration of the current account by 0.6% of 
GDP. They note that a coefficient of this magnitude aligns broadly with the experiences of the UK over the 
last thirty years. 
Using data from 25 countries over the period 1911-2010 Atkinson and Morelli (2010, 2011) look for 
patterns of rising inequality in advance of ‘systemic’ banking crises (as defined by a combination of sources: 
Laeven and Valencia, 2010; Bordo et al., 2001; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008, 2009; and Reinhart 2010). 
Consistent with Rajan’s hypothesis, they find significant increases in income inequality in the US prior to 
both the 1929 crash and the recent financial crisis. However, they find that this pattern is far from universal. 
Whilst a number of the banking crises in their sample were preceded by notable increases in income 
inequality (measured in terms of Gini coefficient and top income shares), many more were not. They 
conclude that banking crises vary a great deal in their nature and causes, and that, even if their analysis did 
reveal consistently rising inequality prior to banking crises, “causality is not easy to establish” (2011, p.49).  
However, they also highlight that their methodology focuses solely on changes in inequality, and so is silent 
about the effect of levels of inequality on financial fragility – an avenue they earmark for further research. 
Another study that contests the universality of a link between income inequality and crises is that of Bordo 
and Meissner (2012). They conduct an econometric investigation into the relationship using a panel of 14 
mainly advanced countries from 1920 to 2008. In the first stage of their research, they investigate the link 
between credit growth and financial crises using a series of logit regressions (with a binary dependent 
variable for financial crises). They find a statistically significant, positive relationship between credit growth 
(over five-year periods) and the occurrence of a financial crisis, in line with the existing literature on credit 
growth and crises. In the second stage of their research, they use a series of fixed effects OLS regressions to 
investigate the determinants of credit growth. As a dependent variable they take the five-year change in 
annual bank lending and regress this on the five-year change in the top 1% income share and various 
additional determinants of credit growth that are theoretically and empirically linked to credit growth in the 
literature. In various specifications of the model, they fail to reject the null hypothesis that growing 
inequality has no statistically significant relationship with credit growth. Based on these findings they reject 
what they call the ‘RKR’ (Rajan, Kumhof and Ranciére) hypothesis, in favour of the more traditional 
determinants of credit growth and crises. 
 
3. Inequality, Deregulation and Credit: Empirical Analysis 
The variety of possible interpretative frameworks just summarised suggest different reasons 
underpinning the cause/effect relations between inequality, policy variables, indebtedness and the outburst of 
a crisis. Consistent with the most general explanations of the inequality/credit growth link discussed in the 
previous section, our objective here is to provide empirical evidence on the existence of a direct relationship 
between income inequality and the size of credit once other possible drivers, including deregulation of 
financial markets, are accounted for. We therefore test here empirically the idea of inequality and 
deregulation driving independently credit growth and whether the effect, if any, of inequality is reinforced or 
not by increasing deregulation of financial markets. Our approach shares many similarities with and is 
mainly inspired by Bordo and Meissner’s (2012) study; however, it significantly departs from it in terms of 
methodology, time/country coverage and variables used. This offers new cross-country empirical evidence 
and additional ground for discussion on the topic. 
Our research objective poses several issues on both the empirical and the econometric side. First of 
all, as usual when dealing with inequality in a panel dimension, gathering the information needed for the 
dataset is a challenging task. For the reasons explained in section 3.1 we limit our dataset to 18 OECD 
countries, over the period 1970-2007. Compared to Bordo and Meissner’s study, we therefore have more 
cross-country observations but a shorter time dimension. This assures higher comparability/homogeneity of 
data and better availability of explanatory variables, while allowing to focus on the period in which major 
developments of interest here (particularly the increase of inequality and the extensive wave of deregulation) 
took place. This comes at the cost of a shorter run perspective which, however, (i) would have been based on 
very fragmentary and heterogeneous empirical materials; and (ii) would be not able to considere (as in 
B&M) and control for the major institutional changes occurred on the side of financial markets, due to lack 
of data before the ‘70s. 
A second major point to be clarified, related to the empirical model specification dealt with in 
section 3.2, is that a credit expansion, although regularly preceding and determining the conditions of a 
financial crisis, is per se not necessarily negative for the economy, when it is driven by factors related to the 
real economy or to the normal developments of macroeconomic aggregates. For this reason, we need to 
analyse the relationships of our interest in the framework of a more general model of credit drivers, derived 
on the basis of the relevant literature. Once other potential factors are controlled for, we are able to isolate 
the effects of other drivers of credit growth (particularly, inequality) potentially conducive to financial 
instability. A third group of problems that need to be addressed, also dealt with in section 3.2, relates to the 
complexity of the relationships among the variables considered, which are far from being univocally 
determined. On the one side, a typical problem of endogeneity related to potential reverse causality exists 
between credit growth and the factors used in the model as its drivers. As the literature summarized in the 
following subsection emphasises, they include the investment rate, GDP growth and the level of 
development, besides inequality. On the other side, our explanatory variables of main interest might not be 
independent each other. Rather, a causality link has been hypothesised both from inequality to deregulation 
(as in Rajan’s explanations) and vice versa (as in Acemoglu’s view); similarly, rising inequality could drive 
monetary expansion (Stiglitz’s hypothesis), which is also obviously in the set of regressors. All these aspects 
are accounted for by proper econometric treatments, namely by instrumenting the potentially endogenous 
variables. On the descriptive side, the direction of causality has been preliminarily tested by means of the 
usual Granger analysis (section 3.2). 
The remainder of this section goes on to discuss the data (section 3.1), before presenting some 
preliminary descriptive evidence (3.2), the econometric models (3.3) and our findings (3.4). 
 
3.1. Data and variables 
Our analysis exploits an unbalanced panel of annual data from eighteen OECD economies4 over the 
period 1970-2007. This represents a shorter time period compared to B&M and is dictated by the choice of 
variables used, which it is argued are conceptually more appropriate. Despite the shorter timeframe, this 
panel covers the key period of interest in which income inequality, deregulation and household indebtedness 
rose in tandem across much of the developed world. 
The dependent variable used in all model specifications is the level of domestic credit to the private 
sector as a percentage of GDP, from World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2012), which 
includes credit from banks and other financial institutions. This is in contrast to B&M, who use the log of 
real bank loans to the private sector. Conceptually, it can be argued that the measure used here is preferable 
because focusing on bank credit only can be misleading in our context here. As Elekdag and Wu (2011) 
maintain, the choice of the credit aggregate is important when attempting to understand financial fragility. A 
variable that includes credit extended by non deposit-taking institutions is preferable, as credit booms can 
arise owing to funds provided by these institutions, especially in periods of high rates of financial innovation 
and deregulation, as it is the one under scrutiny here. The choice of considering the amount of total credit (as 
a % of GDP) in levels, rather than in terms of changes (as in Bordo and Meissner, 2012), is motivated by the 
fact that all the literature emphasises how it is the excessive credit available in the economy that leads to 
financial crisis. On the contrary, whether higher rates of credit growth lead to a financial crisis or not 
                                                
4 To the 14 countries considered by Bordo and Meissner (2012) (Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US), we add Portugal, Finland, Ireland and New 
Zealand. 
depends on the initial level of credit available in the economy, since the same growth rate might translate 
into very different levels of credit and risk. Also, increasing debt levels do not necessarily lead to instability 
per se: other things equal, credit growth accompanied by similar income/productivity growth need not entail 
increased macroeconomic risk. Similarly, unchanged debt levels may involve increased macroeconomic risk 
if income/productivity is falling. This is the reason why it is also necessary to control for per capital GDP 
levels and growth, besides standardising credit on GDP. 
There is one very obvious limitation to both of the credit measures discussed above. This is the fact 
that they comprise household debt (in which we are interested) and the debt of businesses and other private 
organisations (in which, strictly speaking, we are not interested). To get around this, as per Bordo and 
Meissenr (2012), a measure of gross fixed capital formation in % of GDP is also included as an additional 
independent variable in all regressions to account for credit extended to the non-household private sector and 
demanded by the productive system. Similarly, in the framework of a truly Keynesian investment function, 
the inclusion of GDP growth serves as an additional control for credit demand driven by the expectations of 
firms about future levels of demand. 
As a proxy for income concentration and inequality more generally, we follow B&M in using the 
share of total income going to the top 1% of earners, from the World Top Income Database. This data has 
been obtained from historical income tax records by several different teams of researchers following the 
methodology of Piketty (2001). Observation units are individuals, households, or tax units (depending on the 
country) and income includes labour, business and capital income. In some cases, the income concept also 
includes realised capital gains. As a result there are some cross-country comparability issues (although 
small). Some comparability issues may also exist over time resulting from changes to tax legislation 
(Atkinson et al., 2011). Aside from comparability issues, it should be noted that there are also a number of 
conceptual shortcomings of this indicator as a measure of income concentration and income inequality. For 
example, the income concept is market income (i.e., pre tax and transfers), whereas in this context it would 
be preferable to use disposable income (i.e., post tax and transfers), which bears more significantly on 
household/individual budget constraints and thus on consumption, investment and borrowing decisions. 
However, this indicator provides an excellent insight into income concentration at the very top of the 
distribution and it is particularly suitable to represent the side of inequality we consider important here 
(related to the ideas of relative income and consumption cascade effects as drivers of credit); by its own 
nature it offers little information as to what is happening at the bottom of the distribution, except for the fact 
that, if the income share of the top 1% rises, the income share of the remaining 99% must perforce fall. This 
shortcoming of offering a partial view on the distribution is common to all measures of inequality and 
empirical evidence shows top income shares to be strongly correlated with broader inequality measures, such 
as the Gini coefficient (e.g., Leigh, 2007). The top 1% was also chosen since it guaranteed greater coverage 
and comparability across countries and over time and to the precedent in the existing inequality-crisis 
literature (e.g., Bordo and Meissner, 2012; Kumhof et al., 2012). 
The third key variable of our analysis is the indicator of Credit Market (de)regulation (code 5A) 
supplied by the Fraser Institute in the Economic Freedom of the World database (Gwartney et al., 2010). The 
measure, ranging from 0 to 10 in ascending order of deregulation, is a summary indicator of four dimensions 
related to: (i) ownership of banks (measured as the % share of deposits held in private banks); (ii) foreign 
bank competition (computed on the rate of denial of foreign bank applications and of their share of the 
banking sector assets); (iii) private sector credit (as a proxy of the extent to which government borrowing 
crowds out private borrowing; (iv) interest rate controls/negative interest rates (based on the extent of credit 
market controls, market determination of interest rates, stable monetary policy, positive real deposit and 
lending rates). The summary indicators has been extensively used in the existing empirical literature (e.g., 
Giannone et al., 2011, Dawson, 2006; Stankov, 2012;); the alternative credit market regulation index by 
Abiad et al. (2008), also widely employed (e.g., Mendoza and Terrones, 2008; Azzimonti et al., 2012), is 
more limited over time (1973-2005) and would remarkably reduce the number of observations especially in 
the most recent years, of great interest here. An extensive literature has emphasis that deregulation of 
financial markets triggers credit expansion, for example due to increased aggregate supply of financial 
instruments and credit (Bordo and Meissner, 2012), to the consequences of increased competition (Gosh, 
2010; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006), to the emergence of implicit guarantees (Gourinchas at al., 2001; 
Corsetti et al., 2009), to the increase in opportunistic behaviours by bankers (Demirguc Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1998). 
Other variables used in various specifications as controls and identified on the basis of the existing 
literature are, besides the proxy for investments already described, a measure of portfolio investments (as a 
% of GDP) to control for credit demand driven by transactions in equity and debt securities, including 
external liabilities (except those constituting foreign authorities’ reserves). This variable also accounts for 
financial capital inflows usually considered in the literature as related to credit growth (Mendoza and 
Terrones, 2008; Elekdag and Wu, 2011). An alternative option to include (again indirectly) this information 
was to use a measure of current account balance (as a % of GDP), which however never turn out significant 
in the estimates and was therefore excluded to keep the model as parsimonious as possible. Other two 
variables, real interest rate (lending rate adjusted by the GDP deflator) and broad money supply (M2 over 
GDP), act as proxies for the monetary policy environment5. As emphasised by Elekdag and Wu (2011, p. 9), 
the interest rate alone may not be able to accurately represent the level of global liquidity at all times, 
especially more recently due to nonconventional monetary policies. To address this issue, we follow their 
recommendation of complementing the interest rate series by a metric of broad money supply. The use of a 
lending rate (in the place of a policy rate) allows including in the analysis the complexity of institutional 
arrangements on the financial markets which shape cross-country differences in interest rate pass-through 
effects (e.g., ECB, 2009; Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994); in the use of a broad concept of money supply we 
                                                
5 An alternative, indirect approach was to include variables emphasising the role of monetary stabilisation programs, 
such as the rate of inflation or a real exchange rate (Gaouringhas et al., 2001). These two variables, included in the 
model, did not turn out significant and were excluded due to multicollinearity problems they generated. 
follow Schularick and Taylor (2012). All the variables just described are from the World Bank WDI 
database. 
Many studies find that the overall level of economic development, often measured by per capita 
income or income growth measures, is the strongest predictor of financial progress and credit availability 
(see, for example, Adarov and Tchaidze, 2011, and the many references cited therein). We therefore include 
among the regressors the level of real per capita GDP and the annual GDP growth rate (both from: Angus 
Maddison - Statistics on World Population), which also act as further controls for the pro-cyclicality of credit 
(Borio et al., 2001). This is, in facts, already accounted for by standardizing the amount of credit on GDP; 
however, as emphasised by Mendoza and Terrones (2008), this measure can ambiguously represent credit 
expansion, since its growth might be simply due to a GDP decline, with credit being constant. Including 
controls for GDP level and growth contributes addressing this issue. 
 
3.2 Preliminary and Descriptive Evidence 
 As a preliminary step to the main empirical model, we provide evidence on the link between credit 
expansion and the outburst of financial crises. Although credit expansion might be due to financial 
deepening shown to support growth (Levine, 2005) or normal cyclical upswings, rapid credit growth 
episodes are typically associated with growing financial imbalances, and tend to end abruptly, often in the 
form of financial crises (Elekgag and Wu, 2011). As emphasised in the previous sections, an extensive 
literature agrees on the existence of this relationship, which is extensively confirmed empirically. Following 
Bordo and Meissner (2012) and Schularick and Taylor (2012) we explore this relationship in our database 
for the years and countries considered here by estimating the probability of a banking crisis as a function of 
credit expansion in the following form: Pr 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 = 𝑓 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑!,! + 𝛼! + 𝜏! + 𝜀!,!        [1] 
where subscripts i and t refer to countries and years, respectively (i = 1, …, 18; t = 1970, ..., 2010); 
iα  and tτ  are the country and the time specific effects and itε  is an idiosyncratic error term for each country 
and each period. The dependent variable is coded as binary indicator equal to 1 when a banking crisis 
occurred according to Laeven and Valencia (2013) and zero otherwise; the explanatory variable Cred 
describes the amount of credit over GDP as described in the previous sections.  
Figure 1 provides graphical evidence for a selection of countries for which the relationship is 
particularly clear-cut (the dotted vertical lines identify banking crises episodes). 
 
 
Figure 1. Private credit/GDP and crises: select countries, 1970-2010 
  
  
 
Table 1 presents the outcomes, which confirm the existence of a strong, positive, statistically 
significant and robust relationship between the amount of credit available and the probability of a banking 
crisis. These results obtained from our sample, which are consistent with the previous literature, allow and 
encourage us to focus the attention on the fundamentals drivers of credit expansion, particularly to those of 
our interest. 
Table 1. Banking crisis and credit expansion, 1970-2010 
Dep. Var.: 
Banking crisis 
Logit; RE (1) Logit; RE (2) Logit; FE (3) Logit; FE (4) 
cred_GDP 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.046*** 
 
(7.12) (3.80) (7.42) (3.86) 
Const -6.489*** -28.714 - - 
 
(-8.80) (-0.00) - - 
Time dummies No Yes No Yes 
Wald test (RE) / LR test (FE) 50.73*** - 103.80*** 213.27*** 
N observations 719 719 599 599 
Notes: 
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 when a banking crisis occurred according to Laeven and Valencia (2013) 
Z statistics are based on robust standard errors and reported in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.5, *** p<0.01 
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Table 2 provides basic descriptive statistics on them showing that the key variables provide 
acceptable levels of variability both over the cross-section and the time dimension. The data availability on 
inequality poses the most severe constrain to the analysis 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev Min Max Observations 
cred_GDP overall 87.266 44.339 12.767 227.753 N 670 
 
between  31.871 51.708 166.951 n 18 
 
within  32.387 23.008 222.120 T-bar 37.222 
Ineq (top 1%) overall 7.576 2.466 3.490 18.290 N 531 
 between  1.826 4.263 11.706 n 18 
 within  1.721 3.611 17.671 T 29.5 
Dereg (cred mkt) overall 8.231 1.151 4.422 10.000 N 684 
 between  0.883 6.076 9.280 n 18 
 within  0.766 5.821 10.328 T 38 
cap_form_gdp overall 22.567 3.963 15.312 36.372 N 673 
 between  2.799 18.174 28.753 n 18 
 within  2.867 15.263 34.185 T-bar 37.389 
portf_inv_gdp overall -4.335 67.516 -575.262 598.181 N 661 
 between  25.388 -82.258 22.129 n 18 
 within  62.805 -538.388 609.322 T-bar 36.722 
M2_gdp overall 85.751 43.493 18.589 238.975 N 683 
 between  37.389 51.092 169.731 n 18 
 within  23.857 -1.560 242.541 T-bar 37.944 
real_int_rate overall 4.240 3.963 -13.184 19.259 N 676 
 between  1.883 1.781 7.629 n 18 
 within  3.514 -11.065 16.257 T-bar 37.556 
Real_gdp_growth overall 0.027 0.022 -0.076 0.110 N 684 
 between  0.008 0.015 0.049 n 18 
 within  0.021 -0.067 0.103 T 38 
pc_gdp (ln) overall 9.664 0.311 8.608 10.353 N 684 
 between  0.200 9.184 9.999 n 18 
 within  0.243 9.001 10.547 T 38 
 
Table 3. Correlation analysis 
 
cred_GDP Ineq (top1) Dereg (cred mkt) cap_form_gdp portf_inv_gdp M2_gdp real_int_rate pc_gdp (ln) Real_gdp_growth 
cred_GDP 1 
        
Ineq (top1) 0.5030* 1 
       
Dereg (cred mkt) 0.2696* 0.1828* 1 
      
cap_form_gdp -0.1109* -0.2299* -0.3692* 1 
     
portf_inv_gdp -0.0788* 0.0603 -0.0465 0.0910* 1 
    
M2_gdp 0.6931* 0.2903* -0.0795* 0.0734* -0.0327 1 
   
real_int_rate -0.1625* -0.1096* 0.2265* -0.1976* 0.1396* -0.1873* 1 
  
pc_gdp (ln) 0.5832* 0.3745* 0.5783* -0.3839* -0.1756* 0.1795* 0.1706* 1 
 
real_gdp_growth -0.1616* 0.0345 -0.0125 0.0357 -0.0097 -0.0895* -0.1500* -0.2150* 1 
*: significant at the 1% level or better 
 
The simple correlation analysis shows preliminary support to the existence of a remarkably strong 
link between credit expansion and the remaining variables, especially inequality, monetary policy and per 
capita GDP. The relationship between broad money supply and the interest rate, although negative and 
statistically significant, is low, providing evidence of the inability of the interest rate alone to properly depict 
the monetary policy environment (Elekdag and Wu, 2011). Figure 2, plotting the yearly average of credit, 
inequality and financial deregulation, for the 18 countries of our sample, also provides preliminary support to 
the idea of a co-movements between the variables of key interest here. 
Figure 2. Private credit as % of GDP, Top 1% income share, and financial deregulation: mean of 18 
OECD countries 1970-2007	  
 
 
 
This particularly holds after the turbulent 70s, when all three indicators rose sharply until a period of 
stabilization in the first half of the 90s and then kept rising again. The positive inequality/credit relationship 
is particularly straightforward for some countries, as illustrated in the scatterplots in Figure 3. 
The correlation among the remaining variables, then used in our empirical model as drivers of credit 
growth, is instead relatively low. In particular, the weak links between inequality, credit market deregulation 
and monetary policy variables are of interest here, since they are related to interpretative frameworks 
emphasising the role of political economy meachanisms. Results of Granger causality analysis (Granger, 
1969), although not conclusive due to their own nature and limitations, tend to confirm that the empirical 
evidence is far from being supportive to these interpretations (Table 4). Outcomes reveal that the hypothesis 
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of deregulation Granger-causing inequality (as per Acemoglu’s conjecture), or of inequality Granger-causing 
deregulation (Rajan) and monetary expansion (Stiglitz), cannot be accepted.	  
 
Figure 3. Private credit/GDP and inequality: select countries, 1970-2010 
  
  
 
 
Table 4. Granger causality tests (deregulation / inequality and monetary policy/inequality) 
 H0: 
Dereg_cred_mkt does not 
Granger cause Ineq (top1%) 
H0: 
Ineq (top1%) does not 
Granger cause 
Dereg_cred_mkt 
 H0: 
Ineq (top1%) does not 
Granger cause M2_gdp 
 
 F-stat [p_values] F-stat [p_values] N. obs F-stat [p_values] N. obs 
1 lag 1.467 [0.226] 0.981 [0.322] 487 1.387 [0.238] 489 
2 lags 2.794 [0.062] 1.570 [0.209] 468 0.487 [0.615] 470 
3 lags 1.977 [0.116] 1.514 [0.210] 449 0.407 [0.748] 451 
4 lags 1.346 [0.251] 1.194 [0.313] 430 0.341 [0.850] 432 
5 lags 1.591 [0.161] 1.802 [0.111] 411 0.230 [0.949] 413 
Notes: P-values reported in brackets. 
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3.2. Econometric Methods and the Empirical Model 
In order to assess the impact of inequality and deregulation on credit expansion we consider the following 
dynamic model: 
  [1] 
where subscripts i and t refer to countries and years, respectively (i = 1, …, 18; t = 1970, ..., 2007); iα  
and tτ  are the country and the time specific effects and itε  the error terms. The acronyms indicate the 
variables as described in the previous sections. Obviously, the inclusion of country and time specific effects 
is a major advantage of the panel approach, providing controls for unobservable or not properly measured 
drivers of credit, such as global liquidity conditions or foreign capital inflows. Specification [1] is then 
further extended by introducing an interaction variable obtained multiplying the indicators of inequality and 
credit market deregulation, in order to test the possibility that the effect of inequality on credit growth might 
be enhanced under laxer regulatory frameworks. 
The dynamic specification of [1] allows accounting for the fact that within-country credit growth is 
characterized by inertia and can be viewed as a time-persistent phenomenon; neglecting this term, if 
significant, would affect the estimation outcomes due to omitted variable bias. In addition, as previously 
mentioned, specification [1] can be characterized by the presence of other endogenous regressors and reverse 
causality issues. A large body of literature has for example analysed the effect of credit on inequality. 
Theoretical and empirical evidence has spotlighted how the possibility of undertaking investments in 
physical and especially human capital, which is among the main drivers of labour income and socio-
economic mobility (Aristei and Perugini, 2012), may be hampered by the existence of credit constraints (Li 
et al., 1998), credit market imperfections (Galor and Zeira, 1993), and poorly developed financial markets 
(Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). Also, as pointed out by Borio and White (2003), workers and consumers 
have balance sheets that improve during credit expansion, so being able to sustain consumption growth with 
credit rather than demanding wage increases. At the same time, creditors, capitalists and rentiers enjoy 
growing capital gains driven by the economic and financial expansion; the combined effects could lead to a 
surge in both functional and personal income inequality. Similar concerns of inverse direction of causality 
may arise between the size of credit in the economy and the extent of investments, consumption and 
ultimately aggregate demand (e.g., Elekdag and Wu, 2011) and with reference to growth and development 
driven by financial deepening and increased levels of intermediation (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Decressin 
and Terrones, 2011). 
Dealing with all these issue simultaneously is a challenging task, also in view of the characteristics of 
the data available. Our choice here is to use different approaches able to address the various problems 
mentioned and to compare the outcomes, particularly the relationships of interest, step-by-step. As a first 
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pass, we estimate a standard fixed effects model, as in Bordo and Meissner (2012), but employing a Panel 
Corrected Standard Error model, which allows correcting for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of errors 
and obtaining more reliable standard errors (Beck and Katz, 1995). However, the presence of the lagged 
dependent variable, due to its potential correlation with the composite error ,( )i i tα ε+ , may lead to 
inconsistent parameter estimates also when country heterogeneity is accounted for by means of conventional 
fixed- or random-effects estimators (Baltagi, 2001). This is due to the so-called dynamic panel bias which 
however, if T (the time dimension) is large enough, becomes insignificant; under such circumstances, a 
standard straightforward fixed-effects estimator can be employed (Roodman, 2009). Yet, such approach 
would not allow addressing the problems of endogeneity due to potential reverse causality. To deal with this 
issue, we adopt here two different approaches. The first relies on a fixed effect instrumental variable 
estimator based on the Hansen (1982) original Generalized Methods of Moments which allows, besides 
instrumenting the variables at risk of endogeneity, to have standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. As instruments, the validly of which is tested by means of the standard methods, we use a 
mix of internal instruments (up to 2 lags) and external variables derived from the literature and expected to 
impact on inequality, investments and growth and to be uncorrelated with the dependent variable (credit as a 
% of GDP). They include institutional indicators related to labour and product markets, to the rule of law and 
trade openness. As a check for the robustness of the results obtained, we also approach the endogeneity issue 
from another side.  
A possible alternative approach would be using the first-difference GMM estimator proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991), which is based on first-differencing the regression equation to eliminate the 
country-specific effect and using lagged independent variables as instruments. However, for the aim of the 
present analysis, the main issue of using this estimator is related to the possible persistency over time of the 
dependent variable: the cross-sectional variation embodies a large part of the information since within-
country credit size (on GDP) can be, for the reasons previously explained, remarkably persistent. In this 
respect, although the first-difference GMM estimator allows controlling for possible measurement errors, 
country-specific heterogeneity and endogeneity bias, ignoring cross-sectional variation may fatally affect the 
precision of the estimates. Moreover, as pointed out by Blundell and Bond (1998), the lagged levels of the 
explanatory variables are weak instruments for the variables in differences when explanatory variables are 
persistent6. The system GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) allows 
addressing these shortcomings, exploiting also the cross-country variation in the data. In the system-GMM 
approach specifications in first-differences and in levels are combined; namely, the GMM-sys augments the 
GMM-diff by including and equation in levels (so keeping the cross-country dimension) and estimates 
simultaneously in differences and levels. The two equations are separately instrumented. 
The system GMM estimator uses as instruments the lagged values of the endogenous explanatory 
variables, thus requiring a more stringent set of restrictions compared to the GMM-diff. Variables in levels 
are instrumented with lagged first differences; in order to consider these additional moments as valid 
                                                
6 Bond et al. (2001) show that in small samples such weak instruments issue further translate into a large finite sample bias. 
instruments for levels, the identifying assumption that past changes of the explanatory variables are 
uncorrelated with current errors in levels, which include fixed effects, is required (Roodman, 2009). If the 
moment conditions are valid, Blundell and Bond (1998) show that the system GMM estimator performs 
significantly better than the first difference GMM estimator. The validity of the moment conditions can be 
tested by means of the test of overidentifying restrictions proposed by Sargan (1958) and Hansen (1982) and 
by testing the null hypothesis of no second order serial correlation in the error term.  
As already explained, the GMM-Sys estimator has the advantage of allowing instrumentation of 
endogenous variables with internal lags; however, it is designed for large N small T panels and to deal 
efficiently with dynamic panel bias. Its employment to dataset like ours (large T, small N) may cause a 
natural proliferation of the number of instruments. Although this does not compromise consistency, a small 
N may lead to unreliable cluster-robust standard error and AB autocorrelation test (Roodman, 2009), and 
weaken the Hansen test to the point where it generates implausibly good p-values of 1.000 (Anderson and 
Sorenson 1996; Bowsher 2002). However, system GMM estimation allows some flexibility by means of 
several specification choices. In particular, given the structure of our panel we use the one-step estimator and 
correct the standard errors to take account for small-sample bias and heteroschedasticity, by applying the 
Huber and White robust variance estimator. Furthermore, to address the problem of the overfitting bias 
caused by instrument proliferation in dynamic panels, we use a combined strategy obtained by collapsing 
instruments (i.e., creating one instrument for each variable and lag distance only, with 0 substituted for any 
missing values) and restricting the number of lags used as instruments. We of course keep the GMM-Sys 
shortcomings in mind when interpreting results, which are however mainly used as a robustness check for 
those obtained with previous approaches.  
As in most empirical studies on inequality, the estimation of the empirical model relies on an unbalanced 
and unequally spaced panel dataset. The use of a panel of unequally spaced spells, while allowing to keep the 
sample size reasonable high, could lead to an over representation of countries with a large number of 
observation and to inconsistent estimates if one period in the theoretical model has to perfectly correspond to a 
certain time span in empirical data (Tamm et al., 2007). This is kept on mind in the interpretation of results. 
 
3.3. Results 
Table 5 reports the estimates of our empirical model, which first of all highlight an overall stability 
to alternative econometric approaches. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is always positive 
and significant, confirming the validity and the necessity of a dynamic specification. Conceptually, this 
evidence can be explained in terms of herd behaviour, as explained by Rajan (1994). The fact that others are 
lending may be considered as invaluable information concerning the creditworthiness of a potential 
borrower; more importantly, being performance generally assessed relative to some market benchmark, 
managers from financial institutions have a strong incentive to behave as their peers, reinforcing credit 
expansion inertially over time (Gosh, 2010). 
Table 5. Credit, inequality and financial deregulation (18 countries, 1970-2007) 
Dep. Var.: 
Cred_GDP 
PCSE IV (1) IV (2) IV (3) IV (4) GMM sys 
(1) 
GMM sys 
(2) 
GMM sys 
(3) 
GMM sys 
(4) 
L (1) cred_GDP 0.829*** 0.852*** 0.845*** 0.870*** 0.870*** 0.831*** 0.832*** 0.836*** 0.841*** 
 
(0.016) (0.049) (0.049) (0.054) (0.054) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.017) 
Ineq (top 1%) (a) 0.417** 0.818** 0.805** 0.811* 0.810* 1.131* 1.042* 0.897* 0.734*** 
 
(0.199) (0.310) (0.387) (0.456) (0.456) (0.596) (0.611) (0.505) (0.210) 
Dereg (cred mkt) 2.105*** 1.644*** 1.693*** 1.951*** 1.952*** 1.416*** 1.560*** 1.791*** 1.478*** 
 
(0.408) (0.537) (0.512) (0.564) (0.565) (0.429) (0.534) (0.492) (0.471) 
cap_form_gdp (b) 0.999*** 0.868*** 1.000*** 0.775*** 0.774*** 0.514*** 0.679* 1.176*** 0.482* 
 
(0.119) (0.203) (0.249) (0.239) (0.239) (0.138) (0.412) (0.398) (0.273) 
portf_inv_gdp -0.018*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.030*** -0.024** 
 
(0.005) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
M2_gdp 0.076*** 0.063* 0.078* 0.053 0.052 0.084*** 0.080*** 0.068*** 0.083*** 
 
(0.013) (0.037) (0.042) (0.039) (0.039) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) 
real_int_rate 0.081 0.006 -0.030 0.003 0.003 0.049 0.043 0.087 0.076 
 
(0.071) (0.156) (0.152) (0.172) (0.173) (0.158) (0.158) (0.158) (0.158) 
Real_gdp_growth (c) 0.938 4.779 5.144 -63.917 -63.900 -6.933 -4.961 54.577 -25.534 
 
(14.758) (17.852) (16.891) (63.676) (63.669) (24.919) (25.152) (41.006) (22.558) 
pc_gdp (ln) (d) 14.472*** 15.516*** 18.327*** 13.664* 13.724* 7.867*** 8.217*** 10.129*** 7.557*** 
 
(3.714) (5.029) (5.670) (7.077) (7.087) (2.418) (2.491) (2.673) (2.405) 
Instrumented 
Variables 
- a a, b a, b, c a, b, c, d a a, b a, b, c a, b, c, d 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
[Joint significance] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.012] [0.002] [0.001] 
Wald Test [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
N 505 469 445 469 469 505 505 505 505 
R2 0.991 - - -  - - - - 
Centered R2 - 0.922 0.917 0.921 0.921 - - - 
 
- 
Underid. Test - 19.850 (3) 
[0.000] 
19.639 (5) 
[0.002] 
26.693 (4) 
[0.000] 
26.668 (4) 
[0.000] 
- - - - 
Weak Instrum. 
Cragg-Donald F stat 
- 318.320 137.013 14.941 12.802 - - - - 
Hansen J (overid) 
staistics. 
- 4.021 (2) 
[0.134] 
4.728 (4) 
[0.316] 
5.302 (3) 
[0.151] 
5.305 (3) 
[0.150] 
- - - - 
Endog. Test - 1.938 (1) 
[0.1639] 
5.317 (2) 
[0.070) 
2.680 (3) 
[0.443] 
2.755 (4) 
[0.599] 
- - -- - 
A-B AR(1) test  - - - - - -10.45 
[0.000] 
-10.42 
[0.000] 
-10.39 
[0.000] 
-10.55 
[0.000] 
A-B AR(2) test - - - - - 1.43 
[0.152] 
1.41 
[0.158] 
1.42 
[0.155] 
1.42 
[0.154] 
Sargan overid. test - - - - - 1.65 (3) 
[0.648] 
1.40 (4) 
[0.844] 
6.66 (7) 
[0.465] 
12.85(10) 
[0.232] 
Notes: 
T statistics are based on robust standard errors and reported in brackets; A-B AR(1) and A-B AR(2) are tests for first- and second-
order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals (Arellano and Bond, 1991) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.5, *** p<0.01 
 
As for the other control variables, capital formation emerges as positively related to credit, 
confirming the long and extensive literature arguing that investments (especially those driven by 
technological breakthroughs and displacement) need to be financed with credit (Fisher, 1933; Minsky, 1986). 
Also as expected (Elekdag and Han, 2012; Eleldag and Wu, 2011), larger money availability (M2/GDP) 
drives credit expansion; similarly, more advanced levels of development (per capita GDP) are positively 
associated to higher credit. The size of portfolio investments, which also include external liabilities and 
should control for capital inflows, is either not significant or negative, indicating, as per Mendoza and 
Terrones (2008) that credit expansion is lower in the presence of large portfolio investments. The remaining 
control variables (real interest rate and GDP growth) only turn up significant in a few sporadic cases. All 
results are robust to the adoption of IV approaches, which allows for potential endogeneity of explanatory 
variables. 
In all specifications the proxy for financial liberalisation is found to have a positive, statistically 
significant (at more than a 99% confidence level) effect on private sector credit, firmly justifying its 
inclusion in the model and indicating that its exclusion would certainly lead to omitted variable bias. This 
evidence is consistent with the conceptual explanations provided by the literature (e.g., Gosh, 2010; 
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Gourinchas at al., 2001) and well-established empirical findings (e.g., 
Mendoza and Terrones, 2008). 
As far as the focus of our analysis is concerned, the coefficient of the inequality variable (top1) is 
positive and significant in all estimates, suggesting that higher inequality directly drives higher credit, once 
its conventional determinants are controlled for. This is consistent with the line of reasoning illustrated by 
Kumhof and Rancière (2011) and Kumhof et al. (2012), that we developed in terms of relative income 
(Duensberry, 1949; Barba and Pivetti, 2009) and expenditure cascades (Frank et al., 2010) hypotheses. 
Therefore we found clear cross-country evidence that inequality impacts on credit. 
Generally speaking, a major concern when studying the effects of inequality is the dependence of 
outcomes on specific measure of inequality employed (used, since they can produce different outcomes 
(Litchfield, 1999). In order to assess the robustness of the effects of inequality on credit growth, we carried 
out additional estimations using the share income hold by the top 5 and top 10% of the distribution. Results 
are reported in table 6 and confirm that higher inequality triggers higher credit; similarly, the signs and 
significance of the remaining variables remain virtually unchanged. 
Although the literature explored here envisages direct and independent relationships between credit 
expansion and inequality on the one side and financial deregulation on the other, other recent contributions 
tend to hypothesize a joint, self-reinforcing interaction effect. Tridico (2012), for example, conjectures that 
the rise of inequality generated on the labour market led to an increased demand of credit, which translated 
into a credit expansion due to the increase of supply fed by lax monetary policies and financial deregulation. 
This would suggest that the effect of inequality on credit expansion should be magnified by deregulation; 
translated into empirical terms, the interaction term between metrics of inequality and deregulation should 
turn out positive and significant in the estimates. The estimation of the models with the inclusion of this 
interaction effect (columns 1-3 of table A1 in the appendix) does not provide support to the possibility that 
inequality may further foster credit expansion in presence of less regulated institutional settings. On the 
contrary, the interaction terms render the main effects insignificant: so they do not add any additional 
information to the model, while producing only disturbance due to redundant information. In columns 4-6 
(Table A1) we test the possibility that this effect might be confined only to countries with very high levels of 
deregulation; to this aim, the interaction term is generated by multiplying the inequality indicator and a 
dummy variable that is one if the corresponding level of deregulation is in the top decile of its distribution, 
and zero otherwise. This sorts out the issues of multicollinearity (the main effects re-gain significance) but 
the coefficient of the interaction term is again not statistically different from zero. This means that while 
there is a direct effect of inequality on credit (and of deregulation on credit), it is not magnified by 
deregulation. Therefore, the two effects acted separately on credit expansion, without self-reinforcing 
patterns. 
 
Table 6. Robustness of the outcomes to different measures of inequality: top 5 and top 10% 
  Top 5 %    Top 10%  
Dep. Var.: Cred_GDP PCSE 
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
GMM sys 
(3) 
 PCSE 
(4) 
IV 
(5) 
GMM sys 
(6) 
L (1) cred_GDP 0.829*** 0.882*** 0.843***  0.839*** 0.882*** 0.825*** 
 
(0.015) (0.040) (0.019)  (0.014) (0.040) (0.022) 
Ineq(a) 0.256*** 0.454* 0.495***  0.209** 0.306* 0.447*** 
 
(0.092) (0.251) (0.151)  (0.087) (0.184) (0.118) 
Dereg (cred mkt) 2.184*** 1.843*** 1.201***  1.773*** 1.639** 1.568*** 
 
(0.406) (0.627) (0.488)  (0.414) (0.677) (0.509) 
cap_form_gdp(b) 0.954*** 0.718*** 0.502*  0.838*** 0.766*** 0.666** 
 
(0.061) (0.212) (0.280)  (0.129) (0.275) (0.308) 
portf_inv_gdp -0.016*** 0.002 -0.023**  -0.016*** -0.002 -0.023** 
 
(0.004) (0.012) (0.010)  (0.005) (0.014) (0.010) 
M2_gdp 0.069*** 0.043 0.079***  0.085*** 0.056 0.059*** 
 
(0.011) (0.036) (0.017)  (0.014) (0.040) (0.018) 
real_int_rate 0.086 -0.030 0.103  0.111 0.004 0.039 
 
(0.059) (0.150) (0.170)  (0.079) (0.166) (0.175) 
Real_gdp_growth(c) -5.724 -81.300 -32.391  -1.746 -110.000 -29.164 
 
(10.510) (52.604) (25.410)  (17.433) (70.373) (26.712) 
pc_gdp (ln) (d) 11.439*** 9.009** 10.538***  5.961*** 10.478** 9.374*** 
 
(1.837) (4.067) (3.044)  (1.816) (4.468) (2.678) 
Instrumented Variables - a, b, c, d a, b, c, d  - a, b, c, d a, b, c, d 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
[Joint significance] [0.000] [0.029] [0.002]  [0.000] [0.005] [0.000] 
Wald Test [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
N 484 441 484  459 383 459 
R2 0.991 - -  0.989 - - 
Centered R2 - 0.919 - 
 
 - 0.912 - 
 
Underid. Test - 28.357 (6) 
[0.000] 
-  - 17.623 (5) 
[0.000] 
- 
Weak Instrum. Cragg-Donald F stat - 8.382 -  - 3.476 - 
Hansen J (overid) staistics. - 7.933 (5) 
[0.160] 
-  - 4.806 (4) 
[0.308] 
- 
Endog. Test - 3.442 (4) 
[0.487] 
-  - 4.364 (4) 
[0.359] 
-- 
A-B AR(1) test  - - -9.92 
[0.000] 
 - - -9.77 
[0.000] 
A-B AR(2) test - - 1.33 
[0.184] 
 - - 1.42 
[0.155] 
Sargan overid. test - - 29.25 (42) 
[0.932] 
 - - 34.46 (52) 
[0.971] 
Notes: 
T statistics are based on robust standard errors and reported in brackets.; A-B AR(1) and A-B AR(2) are tests for first- and second-
order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals (Arellano and Bond, 1991) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.5, *** p<0.01 
4. Discussion and final remarks 
The principle aim of this study was to show that that higher inequality leads to increased credit demand and 
indebtedness, which then results in higher financial fragility eventually resulting in a crisis. This turns 
conventional wisdom from the head on its feet. The causality chain from higher inequality to crisis rather 
than the other way round finds strong support by empirical evidence. With respect to the various measure of 
inequality used here, this underpins the Kumhof and Rancière view, augmented with the relative income 
hypothesis of consumption and the imitative consumption cascade conjecture. These results are however not 
consistent with B&M, who used a smaller set of countries, a longer time period, and an empirical approach 
from which we depart remarkably in terms of: the measure of credit employed, control for potential 
endogeneity biases, the effects of changing financial markets institutional arrangement, and econometric 
techniques. Therefore our study provides a contribution to scanty and sparse empirical literature on the topic, 
suggesting that more research effort should be devoted to the impact of inequality on the stability of modern 
capitalistic models of society. One option for future research is to focus on microeconomic analysis of the 
relationship between the individual’s relative position in the income ladder, consumption and recourse to 
credit. 
The particular contribution of this study lies in providing evidence on a cross-country basis not limited to 
US, as most other related studies do and to which all conjectures on the link between inequality and crisis 
refer to. The analysis adds to the existing knowledge on other episodes of credit booms / financial crisis (see 
B&M, p.2160, last paragraph of section 5) in which inequality was not considered as a possible driver at all. 
The view that inequality is not significant, as B&M maintain, is rejected on the basis of rigorous 
methodological grounds. The findings of this study are interpreted as a stimulus to consider the role of 
inequality on credit expansion and financial instability in a wider context than the US in view of alternative 
country-specific possible explanations and varieties of capitalism. All previous explanations associated with 
credit booms and banking crises to factors are controlled for in the model presented, i.e., deregulation, 
monetary policy, investment inflows, expansionary monetary policy. Even after these controls it is shown 
that rising inequality drives rising credit conducive to crisis. 
A further contribution of this study lies in the explicit consideration of the impact of deregulation. This has 
not been done before, but omitting it might result in remarkable biases on the measured effects of the other 
explanatory variables. Policy implications of our analysis are that various factors concur to shape the risk of 
excessive credit growth and financial instability and most of them seem related to policy tools that have 
traditionally represented the role of the state in the economy, i. e. monetary policy, redistributive policies and 
regulation.  These have been gradually given up or sacrificed to monetary or fiscal rules or to the ideologies 
of deregulation of markets. The findings of this study call for a return of income inequality as an important 
factor relevant for macroeconomic aggregates and stability. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Credit, inequality and deregulation (18 countries, 1970-2007) – with interaction 
(ineq*dereg) 
Dep. Var.: Cred_GDP PCSE 
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
GMM sys 
(3) 
PCSE 
(4) 
IV 
(5) 
GMM sys 
(6) 
L (1) cred_GDP 0.829*** 0.851*** 0.829*** 0.830*** 0.867*** 0.840*** 
 
(0.016) (0.057) (0.023) (0.016) (0.054) (0.017) 
Ineq (top 1%) )(a) -0.298 -2.067 0.225 0.416** 0.786* 0.704*** 
 
(1.979) (4.123) (5.937) (0.195) (0.476) (0.212) 
Dereg (cred mkt) 1.615 0.094 0.851 2.106*** 1.870*** 1.190** 
 
(1.419) (2.697) (4.575) (0.397) (0.568) (0.529) 
Ineq * Dereg (b) 0.081 0.335 -0.003 - - - 
 
(0.224) (0.484) (0.669)    
Top der_d * Ineq(b) - - - -0.001 -0.225 0.337 
    (0.088) (0.184) (0.277) 
cap_form_gdp(c) 0.989*** 0.758*** 0.411 0.999*** 0.790*** 0.471* 
 
(0.132) (0.232) (0.304) (0.121) (0.226) (0.271) 
portf_inv_gdp -0.018*** -0.004 -0.019* -0.018*** 0.002 -0.024** 
 
(0.005) (0.013) (0.011) (0.005) (0.013) (0.010) 
M2_gdp 0.075*** 0.055 0.100*** 0.076*** 0.065* 0.085*** 
 
(0.014) (0.034) (0.025) (0.013) (0.039) (0.016) 
real_int_rate 0.083 -0.019 -0.009 0.081 -0.015 0.061 
 
(0.072) (0.168) (0.166) (0.071) (0.178) (0.158) 
Real_gdp_growth(d) 0.463 -87.326 -6.732 0.943 -43.201 -25.141 
 
(14.547) (68.970) (26.433) (14.839) (58.716) (22.497) 
pc_gdp (ln) (e) 14.662*** 13.991** 16.767** 14.488*** 17.543*** 7.741*** 
 
(3.835) (6.992) (7.103) (3.710) (6.241) (2.397) 
Instrumented Variables - a, b, c, d, e a, b, c, d, e - a, b, c, d, e a, b, c, d, e 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
[Joint significance] [0.000] [0.001] [0.191] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] 
Wald Test [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
N 505 469 505 505 453 505 
R2 0.991 - - 0.957 - - 
Centered R2 - 0.920 - 
 
- 0.918 - 
 
Underid. Test - 28.362 (4) 
[0.000] 
- - 25.823 (6) 
[0.000] 
- 
Weak Instrum. Cragg-Donald F stat - 9.694 - - 9.226 - 
Hansen J (overid) staistics. - 5.048 (3) 
[0.168] 
- - 8.005 (5) 
[0.156] 
- 
Endog. Test - 3.877 (5) 
[0.168] 
- - 2.631 (5) 
[0.757] 
-- 
A-B AR(1) test  - - -10.48 
[0.000] 
- - -10.51 
[0.000] 
A-B AR(2) test - - 1.48 
[0.138] 
- - 1.44 
[0.151] 
Sargan overid. test - - 13.78 (11) 
[0.245] 
- - 14.61 (13) 
[0.332] 
Notes: 
T statistics are based on robust standard errors and reported in brackets; A-B AR(1) and A-B AR(2) are tests for first- and second-
order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals (Arellano and Bond, 1991) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.5, *** p<0.01 
